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James R. Beaty1 and Brett R. Starr.2 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, 23681 
and 
John W. Gowan, Jr.3 
NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, 77058 
Ares-I-X is the designation given to the flight test version of the Ares-I rocket (also 
known as the Crew Launch Vehicle - CLV) being developed by NASA. As part of the 
preliminary flight plan approval process for the test vehicle, a range safety malfunction turn 
analysis was performed to support the launch area risk assessment and vehicle destruct 
criteria development processes. Several vehicle failure scenarios were identified which could 
cause the vehicle trajectory to deviate from its normal flight path, and the effects of these 
failures were evaluated with an Ares-I-X 6 degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) digital simulation, 
using the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories Version 2 (POST2) simulation 
framework. The Ares-I-X simulation analysis provides output files containing vehicle state 
information, which are used by other risk assessment and vehicle debris trajectory 
simulation tools to determine the risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the launch 
area at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and to develop the vehicle destruct criteria used by 
the flight test range safety officer. The simulation analysis approach used for this study is 
described, including descriptions of the failure modes which were considered and the 
underlying assumptions and ground rules of the study, and preliminary results are 
presented, determined by analysis of the trajectory deviation of the failure cases, compared 
with the expected vehicle trajectory. 
Nomenclature 
ATK          = Alliant TechSystems (a division of ATK Thiokol, Inc.).  
6-DOF = six degrees-of-freedom 
POST2      =   Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories, Version 2 
q-α            =   Product of vehicle dynamic pressure, pounds per square foot (q) and its angle of attack, deg (α) 
q-β            =   Product of vehicle dynamic pressure, pounds per square foot (q) and its sideslip angle, deg (β) 
RoCS        =   Roll control system 
RSRM       =   Reusable solid rocket motor   
TVC          =   Thrust vector control 
 
I. Introduction 
HIS document describes a simulation trajectory study that was performed to support the preliminary flight plan 
approval for the Ares-I-X vehicle. This study, referred to as the “malfunction turn analysis”, describes several 
vehicle failure modes that have been identified which could cause the vehicle trajectory to deviate from its normal 
flight path. The effects of these failures were evaluated with a 6 degrees-of-freedom digital simulation, using the 
Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories Version 2 simulation framework. The Ares-I-X simulation trajectory 
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analysis provides output files containing vehicle state information, which are used by other risk assessment and 
vehicle debris trajectory simulation tools to determine the risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the launch 
area at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and to develop the vehicle destruct criteria used by the flight test range safety 
officer. The simulation analysis approach used for this study is described, including descriptions of the failure 
modes which were considered and the underlying assumptions and ground rules of the study, and preliminary results 
are presented, determined by analysis of the trajectory deviation of the failure cases, compared with the expected 
vehicle trajectory. 
 
The malfunction turn analysis was conducted in accordance with, and with the cooperation of, the NASA 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP) and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group (RSTWG). 
Members of those organizations are composed of personnel from the following NASA centers:  Johnson Space 
Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Langley Research Center (LaRC), Kennedy Space Center, 
Glenn Research Center (GRC), the United States Air Force 45th Space Wing at Patrick, AFB, FL, and other support 
contractors:  United Space Alliance, LLC and Alliant TechSystems (a division of ATK Thiokol, Inc.). Much of the 
malfunction turn analysis is based on a similar analysis for the Space Shuttle, performed by John W. Gowan, Jr. of 
JSC in August, 2005 (Reference 1).  
 
The purpose of the malfunction turn analysis is to provide vehicle trajectory information to allow other NASA 
range safety personnel to access the risks to personnel and facilities in the immediate vicinity of KSC launch pad 
LC-39B, and to establish vehicle destruct 
criteria to prevent vehicle debris from crossing 
impact limit lines, in the unlikely event of a 
flight test failure. The other Ares-I-X flight test 
mission objectives are not a primary concern of 
the malfunction turn analysis. This paper does 
not address other range safety analyses that also 
comprise the preliminary Ares-I-X flight plan 
data package.  
 
A graphical presentation of the nominal 
Ares-I-X trajectory from Launch Pad LC-39B 
at Kennedy Space Center, Florida is shown in 
Figure 1. 
II. Vehicle Failure Modes 
The malfunction turn analysis considered the 
effects on the vehicle trajectory of several 
single-point potential vehicle failure modes, 
consisting of legacy Space Shuttle failure 
modes, as well as Ares-I-X vehicle-specific 
failure modes. Dual failures were not 
considered for this analysis, unless their 
occurrence can be attributed to a single failure 
mechanism. This analysis did not consider the probability of occurrence of the failure modes that were considered, 
but merely provided the vehicle response to each failure. A separate probabilistic risk assessment is being performed 
to allocate the probability of each failure mode, which will determine the overall risk probability of the Ares-I-X 
flight test vehicle.  
 
The malfunction turn analysis utilizes a failure matrix, in which each vehicle failure mode is initiated separately at 
two second intervals, starting at vehicle release from its launch pad hold-down mechanism, and continuing until 
normal reusable solid rocket motor (RSRM) burnout. In each simulation case, the vehicle trajectory proceeds 
normally until the time of the failure, and is allowed to depart from the normal flight path following the onset of the 
selected failure mode at the pre-determined time after launch.  
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In each simulation case performed for the malfunction turn analysis, the simulation begins with the initiation of 
the launch command, and continues normally through the initial part of the normal vehicle trajectory until the time 
of the simulated vehicle failure mode. Following the time of the failure, the simulation continued until one of the 
following events occurred:  normal burnout of the RSRM has occurred, vehicle has impacted the earth’s surface, 
estimated vehicle structural breakup criteria have been exceeded, or, the time limit for the maximum failure duration 
has been exceeded (selected failure modes only). The vehicle structural breakup simulation termination criterion 
consists of monitoring the products of the vehicle dynamic pressure and its angle of attack (q-α) and sideslip angle 
(q-β). When the absolute value of either of the products, q-α, or q-β, exceeds a maximum value, the simulation will 
terminate at that point to approximate a vehicle structural breakup. Once the simulation termination criteria are met, 
the simulation run terminates immediately; that is, no attempt was made to propagate vehicle debris to ground 
impact. Separate analyses of the vehicle state information provided by the malfunction turn analysis which utilize 
the vehicle “debris catalog”, which defines the ballistic characteristics of vehicle debris resulting from vehicle 
structural break-up to determine the ground impact points of major parts of the vehicle following a structural failure.  
 
The vehicle failure modes that were identified for the malfunction turn analysis are:  loss of thrust vector control 
(TVC), RSRM nozzle burn through, RSRM case breech, and loss of roll control. Each of these failure modes is 
described in detail in the following sections. 
 
A. Loss of thrust vector control  
 
The loss of thrust vector control (TVC) failure modes consist of two different types of failures, both of which are 
caused by single-point failures:  single failures of the individual actuators of the system that rotates the RSRM 
nozzle to vector the thrust in response to flight control system commands, and simultaneous failures of both RSRM 
nozzle actuators caused by a failure of the auxiliary 
power unit (APU) that provides power to the actuators. 
The rotation of the RSRM nozzle to vector the thrust is 
achieved by two linear actuators that are positioned at 
45° angles to the vehicle body frame pitch and yaw axes. 
Figure 2 shows a sketch of the orientation of the two 
actuators, from the observer looking from the bottom of 
the vehicle toward its top, with the vehicle body frame 
y-axis to the right and its z-axis down The vehicle body 
reference frame origin is located at the instantaneous 
vehicle center of mass, with its X-axis parallel to the 
vehicle axis of symmetry and pointing toward the front 
(top) of the vehicle, its Y-axis pointing to the right (from 
the perspective of the crew members in the in the Ares-I, 
or CEV, operational version of the Ares-I-X), and its Z-
axis completing a right handed coordinate system (the Z-
axis points opposite the heads-up direction of crew 
members).  
 
Extension of the tilt actuator (which is defined as positive tilt deflection of the RSRM motor nozzle) pushes the 
RSRM nozzle up and to the right (as viewed from the perspective shown in Figure 2 at the aft end of the vehicle 
with its body frame y-axis pointing to the right and its z-axis pointing down), which produces a component of the 
thrust that is perpendicular to the vehicle axis of symmetry and points down and to the left (again, relative to the 
view depicted by Figure 2). Extension of the tilt actuator (positive tilt deflection of the nozzle) causes vehicle pitch 
up and yaw right thrust moments to be applied about the vehicle body frame axes. Extension of the rock actuator 
(which is defined as positive rock deflection) pushes the RSRM nozzle down and to the right (as viewed from the 
perspective shown in Figure 2 at the aft end of the vehicle with its body frame y-axis pointing to the right and its z-
axis pointing down), which produces a component of the thrust that is perpendicular to the vehicle axis of symmetry 
and points up and to the left (again, relative to the view depicted by Figure 2). Extension of the rock actuator 
(positive rock deflection of the nozzle) causes vehicle pitch down and yaw right thrust moments to be applied about 
the vehicle body frame axes.  
 
+ZB
+YB
45°
45°Rock Actuator
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The failure modes associated with the RSRM nozzle actuators include: single failures of the tilt or rock actuator, in 
which the failed actuator moves to the actuator physical deflection limit of +5 or -5 degrees, or to its null position (0 
degrees), or the actuator fails in-place (in which the actuator stops responding, and maintains its deflection at the 
time of the failure), while the remaining actuator continues to function normally; and double actuator failures, which 
are caused by a single failure affecting both actuators, such as an APU failure, which causes both actuators to fail in-
place, that is, they remain at their deflections at the time of the failure. The deflections used for the in-place failure 
mode actuator failures are determined by examining the actuator deflection time history from Monte Carlo 
simulation analysis of the baseline Ares-I-X trajectory with no failures. Figure 3 shows the minimum and maximum 
deflections for the tilt and rock actuator as a function of time since launch from a 2000-run Monte Carlo ensemble 
simulation of the Ares-I-X baseline trajectory.  For each failure time considered for the in-place actuator failure 
cases, all combinations of the tilt and/or rock deflection from the minimum deflection to the maximum deflection 
(rounded up to the next largest 0.5°) shown in Figure 3 in 0.5 degree increments are simulated. 
 
For example, assume that an in-place actuator 
failure occurs at 52 seconds. The data presented 
in Figure 3 shows that the minimum and 
maximum tilt deflections at that time are -1.06 
and +0.77 degrees, while the minimum and 
maximum rock deflections are -1.10 and +1.15 
degrees, so that separate simulation cases with 
tilt axis in-place deflections of -1.5, -1.0, -0.5, 
0.0, +0.5, and +1.0 degrees and rock axis in-
place deflections of -1.5, -1.0, -0.5, 0.0, +0.5, 
+1.0, +1.5 degrees are simulated for the in-
place TVC failures that occur at 52 seconds. 
Single axis in-place TVC failures of the tilt 
actuator require 6 separate simulation cases, 
single axis in-place TVC failures of the rock 
actuator require 7 separation cases, and 
combined tilt and rock in-place TVC failures 
require 42 separate simulation cases to evaluate 
all combinations of tilt and rock deflections 
between their minimum and maximum 
deflections corresponding to a failure beginning 
at 52 seconds. Thus, the single failure time of 52 
seconds requires a total of 55 separate simulation 
cases to evaluate the effect of in-place TVC failures.  
 
B. RSRM nozzle burn through failure 
 
A description of the RSRM nozzle burn through 
failure mode is provided in Reference 2. Although 
considered highly unlikely, RSRM nozzle burn 
through failures could occur when hot exhaust gases 
passing through the nozzle char and erode the forward 
exit cone / aft exit cone joint, leading to a failure of 
the two-piece nozzle at joint number 1. Figure 4 
shows a schematic cross-section view of the RSRM 
nozzle, with joint number 1 indicated with bullet 
number 1. The specific failure mode considered for 
this failure case assumes a full circumferential, 
instantaneous failure of joint 1, which would cause the 
lower part of the nozzle (to the right of Figure 4) to be 
expelled (along with the attachment point for the tilt 
and rock nozzle actuators). As the actuator attachment 
point with the nozzle would be eliminated in such a 
Direction of gas flow
 
Figure 4  RSRM Nozzle Schematic 
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failure, the RSRM motor nozzle actuators would not be able to control the direction of the nozzle, and the normal 
nozzle deflection limits of ±5 degrees would not apply, since the physical constraining mechanism would be lost. 
Therefore, the maximum nozzle deflections for RSRM nozzle burn through failures are limited to ±9.75 degrees, 
which is the physical limit of the nozzle pivot assembly, rather than the normal ±5 degrees of the TVC system with 
no failures.  
 
In addition to the loss of TVC following a RSRM nozzle burn through failure, the thrust produced is reduced by 
12.6% as a result of the change in the expansion ratio that is caused by the expulsion of the lower part of the nozzle. 
The engineering judgment of the ATK personnel determined that within 4-12 seconds of the nozzle burn through 
failure, some other secondary failure would occur, which would lead to the loss of the vehicle (See Reference 2). 
Therefore, in addition to modeling the 12.6% reduction in thrust and loss of TVC during RSRM nozzle burn through 
failures, a maximum time duration of 12 seconds is used to terminate the simulation following these failures, if the 
other termination criteria (discussed earlier in this section) have not already been met. Figure 5 shows the RSRM 
thrust resulting from a nozzle burn through failure beginning at 16 seconds, compared with the baseline thrust 
profile.  
 
The simulation analysis approach used to evaluate the effects of RSRM nozzle burn through failures does not 
attempt to predict the dynamic deflection of an un-controlled nozzle, once the actuator attachment points with the 
nozzle are lost. Instead, the loss of TVC was modeled by maintaining the deflections of the two actuators at fixed 
positions for the remainder of the trajectory. The free hanging nozzle is limited to a maximum angular deflection of 
9.75° from the nozzle centerline in any tilt/rock combination due to the presence of the nozzle snubber assembly, 
which is assumed to remain intact after the failure. Given these assumptions and ground rules, the RSRM nozzle 
burn through failures are simulated by evaluating 17 separate simulation cases with the nozzle deflection maintained 
at 8 combinations of tilt and rock that provide 9.75° total deflection, 8 combinations of tilt and rock that provide 5° 
total deflection, and one case with the tilt and rock deflections at zero. The cases with 9.75° or 5° total deflections 
include combinations of rock deflection only 
(positive and negative), tilt deflection only 
(positive and negative) and equal magnitude 
tilt and rock (positive and negative 
combinations). These 17 combinations of tilt 
and rock deflections are simulated for each 
failure time in the malfunction turn analysis.  
 
C. RSRM case breech failure 
 
RSRM case breech failures are assumed to be 
the result of a breech, or opening, through the 
outer case of the rocket motor, which allows 
exhaust gasses to pass through and to 
produce thrust which is directed orthogonal 
to the vehicle axis of symmetry, with a 
reduction in the thrust and mass flow rate 
produced by the motor nozzle, as well. The 
Ares-I-X vehicle RSRM is assembled with 
three field joints at which the segments of the 
RSRM are joined together. These field joints 
are assumed to be the most likely location for 
a case breech failure. In Reference 2, ATK provided a parametric model of the thrust, pressure, and mass flow rate 
produced at the nozzle and at the location of a case breech as a function of the time that the failure occurs relative to 
RSRM motor ignition and the radial growth rate of the breech,   Figure 6 presents a schematic of the Ares-I-X 
vehicle, with the locations of the three RSRM field joints shown.  
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Figure 5  RSRM Nozzle Burn Through Failure Thrust Profile 
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The simulation modeling approach used to 
implement RSRM case breech failures consists of 
a series of separate simulation cases for each 
failure time in which the case breech failure 
occurs at various points evenly spaced every 
thirty degrees around the circumference of the 
outer case of the RSRM, and at the axial locations 
of the forward, mid, and aft field joints illustrated 
in Figure 6. The parametric model provided by 
ATK as described in Reference 2 is used to 
predict the nozzle and case breech thrust, 
pressure, and mass flow rate, which are then used 
to predict the forces and moments imparted to the 
Ares-I-X vehicle from the thrust delivered at the 
nozzle as well as at the thrust produced at the 
location of the case breech. Figure 7 presents a 
typical thrust profile for the thrust produced by 
the nozzle and the case breech corresponding to a 
case breech failure initiated at 6 seconds after 
RSRM ignition, compared with a normal thrust 
profile. The figure shows the normal RSRM 
thrust (no failures) in addition to the thrust 
produced from the nozzle and from the case breech location, following the case breech failure at 6 seconds. In 
addition to the reduction in thrust and mass flow rate through the nozzle following a RSRM case breech failure and 
the side thrust produced through the breech in the motor case, the engineering judgment of the ATK personnel 
determined that within 38-48 seconds of outboard case breech failures (those on the part of the RSRM away from 
the Space Shuttle vehicle body, for which the analysis was originally performed), some other secondary failure 
would occur, leading to the loss of the vehicle (See Reference 2). Therefore, in addition to modeling the reduction in 
nozzle thrust and the side thrust from the breech in the RSRM case, this failure mode implements a maximum 
simulation time duration of 48 seconds after the onset of the failure, if other simulation termination criteria 
(described earlier in this section) have not already been met.  
 
D. Loss of roll control failure 
 
The Ares-I-X vehicle employs two arrays of roll control thrusters on opposite sides of the outer shell of the vehicle. 
Each array contains two or four thrusters (the final RoCS design implementation was not yet completed at the time 
that the malfunction turn analysis was performed), with opposing thrusters to apply forces which create only positive 
or negative rolling moments (pure roll couples), and nominally no pitch or yaw moments or net forces on the 
vehicle. The loss of roll control failure mode can be caused three types of failures of the Ares-I-X roll control system 
(RoCS):  following the failure, the RoCS fails to activate any of the RoCS thrusters to produce roll moments as 
commanded by the flight control system (e.g. – always “off”), or any one of the RoCS thrusters fails to fire to 
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Figure 7  RSRM Case Breech Failure Thrust Profile 
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produce the roll moments as commanded by the flight control system (e.g. – individual thruster always “off”), or any 
one of the RoCS thrusters fails to shut off, which results in a continuous application of the rolling moment that exists 
at the time of the failure for the remainder of the mission for that failed thruster (e.g. – individual thruster always 
“on”). Following a review of the design of the proposed RoCS system hardware, the fault analysis indicated that 
other combinations of RoCS failures (e.g. – multiple thrusters failing in the “on” or “off” condition) are not 
consistent with the single failure mechanism ground rules for the malfunction turn analysis (described earlier in this 
section) and were excluded from the present analysis.  
 
An analysis of the design of the RoCS and pitch / yaw flight control system determined that individual single 
thrusters failing always “on” or “off” will not result in a significant departure of the vehicle trajectory from its 
nominal trajectory. The reason is that if a single thruster fails always “on”, the thrusters that provide the opposite 
polarity roll torque will be commanded to fire until the vehicle roll attitudes / roll rates are maintained as 
commanded by the vehicle guidance. Similarly, if a single thruster fails always “off”, the other thruster that provides 
the same polarity roll torque will be commanded to fire until the vehicle roll attitudes / roll rates are maintained as 
commanded by the vehicle guidance. Force and moment imbalances produced by these failure modes not resulting 
in perfect roll couples (as the nominal design provides) will be compensated by the remaining control system 
components that have not failed. In these failure scenarios, the vehicle roll response may not perform as well as the 
nominal system (e.g. – reduced roll axis control bandwidth and response times), but the trajectory should not depart 
significantly from the nominal trajectory. As a result of these analyses of the effects of roll control failures, only one 
case of roll control failure was considered for the malfunction turn analysis:  the entire RoCS fails always “off” at a 
specified time after launch.  
 
III. Simulation Malfunction Turn Analysis Approach 
The simulation analysis approach used to evaluate the effects on the Ares-I-X vehicle trajectory caused by each of 
the failure modes described in the previous section is described in this section. A matrix of simulation casess was 
created, in which separate simulations of the Ares-I-X POST2 6-DOF simulation are made for each of the failures 
considered with the time of failure occurring at different times in the vehicle trajectory, beginning at time zero 
(release of the vehicle hold down mechanism on the launch pad) and every 2 seconds thereafter, until burnout of the 
RSRM (which occurs at approximately 123 seconds after ignition).  
 
The run matrix resulting from the malfunction turn trajectory analysis of the Ares-I-X consists of 5318 separate 
simulation cases. The breakdown of the individual failure modes in the run matrix is as follows:  Loss of TVC 
control:  1970 cases (248 hardover deflections (2 axes x 2 deflections (±5°) x 62 failure times), 124 single axis lock 
in place (2 axes x 62 failure times), 1598 dual axis lock in place (~25 deflection combinations x 62 failure times); 
RSRM nozzle burn through:  1054 cases (17 deflection sets x 62 failure times); RSRM case breech:  2232 cases (12 
angular breech positions x 3 longitudinal breech positions x 62 failure times); loss of roll control:  62 cases (always 
“off” x 62 failure times) 
IV. Simulation Results 
Following the completion of the malfunction turn simulation trajectory analysis, which required a total of 5318 
simulation cases, the outputs were analyzed in order to summarize the result of the analysis. In addition to the 
summary information provided in this section, the following simulation output products are provided for ensuing 
range safety analyses of the vehicle malfunction turn trajectories:  ASCII output files containing vehicle trajectory 
parameters versus time (in one second intervals) for the baseline (no failure) Ares-I-X mission trajectory, and for 
each of the 5318 failure cases; and turn angle summary files. The turn angles contained in the turn angle summary 
files refers to the angle in 3-D space between the vehicle velocity vector for the nominal (no failure) Ares-I-X 
vehicle trajectory and the vehicle velocity following a particular failure. It is computed from the dot product of the 
baseline vehicle velocity vector and the velocity vector for a particular failure case, and is computed every second, 
following the failure. Although not used in the ensuing range safety analysis (which uses the vehicle trajectory 
parameter files containing the vehicle state information following each failure), the turn angle does provide a 
qualitative measure of the amount of vehicle trajectory dispersion caused by the different types of failures which 
were considered, and can be used to quantify the relative effects of each failure. Figure 8 presents a graphical 
portrayal of the composite mean plus and minus 1-σ of the final turn angle (e.g. – at the end of each simulation run) 
versus failure initiation time for the following failure types:  loss of TVC, RSRM nozzle burn through, RSRM case 
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breech, and loss of roll control. The statistics 
for the turn angle at each time were 
computed individually for each of those 
failure types for the various failure sets 
simulated in the malfunction turn analysis 
run matrix.  
 
As can be seen by examining Figure 8 the 
largest turn angles occur for the loss of TVC 
and RSRM nozzle burn through failures in 
which the failure occur early in the vehicle 
trajectory (during the first 15 seconds after 
RSRM ignition). This phenomenon is caused 
by the vehicle structural breakup criterion 
used to terminate the simulation cases if the 
absolute value of the product of vehicle 
dynamic pressure and its angle of attack or 
sideslip angle exceeds a pre-defined limit 
(see description of the malfunction turn 
analysis simulation run termination criteria in 
Section II). Since the vehicle dynamic 
pressure is relatively low during the first 15 
seconds of the vehicle trajectory, the angle of attack or sideslip angle are allowed to increase to larger magnitudes 
before the simulation run is terminated, whereas as the vehicle dynamic pressure increases after 15 seconds after 
RSRM ignition, the maximum allowable angle of attack or sideslip angle before the vehicle structural breakup 
criteria has been reached is reduced accordingly. For example, at the point of maximum vehicle dynamic pressure 
(at approximately 53 seconds after RSRM ignition), the maximum allowable angle of attack or sideslip angle before 
the run is terminated is reduced to approximately 10 degrees, whereas in the first 15 seconds of the trajectory, the 
maximum angle of attack or sideslip angle before the run is terminated could be as large as 50 to 90 degrees. 
Therefore, care should be exercised when using the final turn angle as the sole criteria for judging the relative effects 
of the various failure modes, as the smaller final turn angles seen for some failure modes may be the result of 
exceeding the vehicle structural breakup criteria and then terminating the simulation more quickly (which prevents 
the turn angle from increasing as much) than for other failure cases with larger turn angles. However, it is still a 
good measure of the severity of the malfunction turn, since early vehicle breakup will result in debris impact areas 
closer to the nominal ground track.  
 
Beyond approximately 15 seconds after 
RSRM ignition, the case breech failure 
provides the largest deviation in the turn 
angle, followed by the RoCS failure cases. 
Figure 9 shows the mean plus and minus 1-σ 
final turn angle information already shown in 
Figure 8, but with the scaling changed to 
exclude the peak values seen during the first 
15 seconds of the vehicle trajectory.  
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Figure 8  Turn Angle Summary – Mean ± 1 σ 
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Figure 9  Turn Angle Summary – Mean ± 1 σ (larger scaling) 
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V. Conclusion 
The methodology used to evaluate the effects of failures in the vehicle TVC system, RoCS, RSRM nozzle burn 
through and case breech failures for the Ares-I-X malfunction turn analysis has been defined. A simulation run 
matrix consisting of a total of 5318 POST2 simulation cases was defined, and those cases were simulated to evaluate 
each of these failure modes, and to generate vehicle trajectory state data files which will be used for ensuing range 
safety analyses for the Ares-I-X preliminary flight data plan. 
 
Preliminary analysis of the simulation results indicate that the loss of TVC failures (especially the hard-over failures 
of the RSRM nozzle actuators) and RSRM nozzle burn through failures provide the largest amount of vehicle 
trajectory dispersion during the early part of the vehicle trajectory (less than approximately 15 seconds after RSRM 
ignition), whereas the RSRM case breech and loss of RoCS failures provide the largest amount of vehicle trajectory 
dispersion during the middle part of the vehicle trajectory (from 20 to 80 seconds after RSRM ignition).  
 
The vehicle trajectory data files produced during this malfunction turn analysis define the vehicle trajectory state 
variations that could be expected for the Ares-I-X flight test vehicle, and will be used during ensuing range safety 
analyses to complete its preliminary flight data plan including flight test launch abort criteria, impact limit lines, and 
the overall risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the KSC launch pad. 
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